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Financing Higher Standards in Public
Education: The Importance of
Accounting for Educational Costs
William Duncombe and John Yinger
Performance standards have been at the center of recent debates on
educational reform. Many states have implemented new performance
standards, often based on student test scores, and a district’s state aid is
sometimes linked to its success in meeting the standards. This focus on
performance is designed primarily to promote better student
achievement by holding schools accountable. However, a school’s
performance is influenced not only by the actions of its administrators
and teachers but also by factors outside its control, such as the nature
of its student body. A recent article in The New York Times expresses
this concern very clearly. In a discussion of report cards and school
rankings, now used in 35 states, this article points out that
because such rankings are often based exclusively on test
scores, which give only a partial snapshot of a school’s
performance, some educators worry that schools may be unfairly
blackballed, especially those with high populations of poor
children (Steinberg 1998).
Thus, a focus on performance is inevitably unfair, especially to cities,
unless it accounts for the impact on performance of factors outside the
control of school officials. Otherwise, some schools get credit for
favorable conditions that were not of their making and other schools get
blamed for unfavorable conditions over which they have no control. To
be fair, school report cards and performance-based state aid systems
must distinguish between poor performance based on external factors
and on school inefficiency.  Many state aid systems have taken one step
in this direction by compensating districts with low wealth, a factor
over which they have no control. However, school district performance
is also influenced by the cost of education, which varies widely from
district to district based on local wage rates, student characteristics, and
other external factors. Existing state aid formulas either ignore these
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factors altogether or else use ad hoc corrections, such as “weighted
pupil” counts, that account for them partially at best.
The focus on student performance is consistent with the movement in
state courts towards addressing deficiencies in educational “adequacy”
rather than relative equity (Underwood 1995). According to Clune
(1994, p. 377), “A social consensus now seems to be developing
around high minimum achievement as the common goal for educational
adequacy,” and since 1989, several state courts have ruled that their
state constitution guarantees students an adequate level of educational
opportunity (Fuhrman, Elmore, and Massell 1993). The emphasis on
adequacy in state education litigation magnifies the need to consider
cost differences across districts.
In this policy brief, we explain why a performance focus and
educational cost indexes must go hand in hand, discuss alternative
methods for estimating educational cost indexes, and show how these
costs indexes can be incorporated into a performance-based state aid
program. We show, using data from New York State, that controlling
for costs in the design of school aid formulas is crucial to enable central
cities to reach educational adequacy standards.
The Conceptual Foundations of
Educational Cost Indexes
An educational cost index is designed to measure how much a district
would have to spend, relative to the average district, to obtain any
given performance target. This section explains the relationship
between performance measures and cost indexes, and discusses, in
general terms, the factors that influence educational costs.
Measuring Performance
One cannot set an educational performance standard without selecting
a way to measure performance.  Policy makers may wish to avoid this1
choice, because selecting a standard is inevitably difficult and
controversial; no set of performance standards can capture all aspects
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of learning, and schools may respond to specific standards by “teaching
to the test” or otherwise shifting their resources to meet the standard at
the expense of other legitimate objectives. Nevertheless, this choice
cannot be avoided. Any policy to enhance school performance involves,
either explicitly or implicitly, a specific performance measure.
For the most part, the selection of performance measures is based on
the judgement of politicians and educational policy officials, perhaps
with some input from scholars. The most common measure is a test
score, such as an average elementary reading or math score, but the
high-school dropout rate also has been used. The use of several
measures makes it possible to capture success in a range of educational
activities. Policy makers also must indicate the level of performance
school districts are expected to meet. For example, school districts
might be expected to reach a certain average test score and a certain
graduation rate.
We have developed an alternative approach, which selects performance
indicators on statistical grounds. This approach determines which
performance indicators are valued by voters, as indicated by their
correlation with property values and school spending, and results in an
index of educational performance (see Duncombe, Ruggiero and
Yinger 1996; Duncombe and Yinger 1997). This index is a weighted
average of the statistically significant performance indicators, where the
weights reflect the value voters place on each indicator.  In the case of2
New York State, this approach leads to an index based on three
performance indicators: the average share of students above the
standard reference point on the third and sixth grade PEP tests for math
and reading, the share of students who receive a more demanding
Regents diploma (which requires passing a series of exams), and the
graduation rate. These indicators reflect a wide range of school district
activities and reflect success at both the high and low ends of the
student performance distribution.
Although these indicators are identified by an objective, statistically
based procedure, they do not, of course, summarize all educational
activities by a school district. Like all other approaches to measuring
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performance, this approach makes the problem manageable through
simplification. Moreover, this approach results in a performance
yardstick, but it cannot determine the point on the yardstick that school
districts should be expected to meet. As with other approaches, the
selection of the performance target must be based on the judgement of
public officials.
Separating Factors In and Outside
the Control of School Officials
Performance standards are intended to boost a school district’s
incentive to improve its performance. The problem, however, is that
actual performance is influenced not only by the decisions of school
officials but also by factors outside their control. Thus, some districts
find it easy to meet a standard even if they are very inefficient, whereas
others find it impossible to meet a standard even if they are more
efficient than average. It is neither fair nor effective for a state to
reward districts that achieve high performance (or to punish districts
that perform poorly) based on factors that are outside their control.
The central issue is that some school districts face relatively high input
prices (such as teacher salaries) or relatively harsh educational
environments, both of which raise the cost of meeting any educational
performance standard. The role of these factors can be summarized
with an educational cost index. To ensure fairness across districts and
to encourage performance improvements, a performance standard
should reward districts that perform well (or punish districts that
perform poorly) relative to other districts with the same costs.
The Role of Input Prices
In the case of education, the most important input is teachers, so in
constructing a cost index, it is vital to account for teachers’ salaries.
Secondary inputs, such as school facilities, also play a role in delivering
education, but data on the prices of these inputs are generally not
available.
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A cost index should measure the impact of factors outside the control
of school officials. It is not appropriate, therefore, to directly use actual
teachers’ salaries in constructing a cost index because those salaries
reflect both the generosity of the school district and the underlying
labor market conditions. A cost index should reflect the fact that some
school districts are located in high-wage labor markets where they
must pay high salaries to attract people away from other school districts
or away from the private market; and it should reflect the fact that the
external conditions in some school districts are so harsh that teachers
will not come there without receiving “combat pay”; but it should not
reflect the fact that some school district administrators pay higher
salaries than necessary to attract their teachers, because they are poor
negotiators or for any other reason.
The influence of school officials on teachers’ salaries poses a challenge
to anyone who wants to construct a cost index. As discussed in a later
section, however, well-known statistical procedures can separate the
impact of school officials on teachers’ salaries from the impact of
external factors and produce a cost index based only on factors outside
the control of school officials.
The Role of Environmental Factors
The cost of meeting a performance standard depends on input prices
and on the environment in which the relevant services are provided.
This section explains the impact of environmental factors on
educational costs and shows how it can be estimated using widely
available data.
The role of environmental factors, also called fixed inputs, was first
identified in the Coleman Report (1966), which showed that a student’s
performance on standardized tests depended not only on his own
characteristics and family background but also on the characteristics
and backgrounds of the students in his class. All else equal, for
example, a student’s performance declines as the share of classmates
from poor households increases. This finding translates into a statement
about educational costs. If performance declines as student poverty
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increases, then a district with a high poverty rate cannot achieve the
same performance as a district with a low poverty rate without running
programs (which, of course, cost money) to offset the impact of
poverty. 
The important role of environmental factors in educational production
has been verified by dozens of studies. A review of many early studies
is provided by Hanushek (1986). Good recent studies include Ferguson
(1991), Ferguson and Ladd (1996), and Krueger (1997). The study by
Ferguson and Ladd, for example, finds that a student’s fourth-grade
educational performance (on reading and math tests) is affected by,
among other things, the share of students receiving a free lunch (a
measure of poverty), the share of adults in the district with a college
degree, a measure of student turnover, and district enrollment.
Production studies focus on the impact of environmental factors on
performance, holding constant inputs selected by the school, such as
the student-teacher ratio. These studies imply that costs are higher in
school districts with a harsher educational environment, but do not
estimate cost differences directly. Moreover, they address a single
performance measure at a time and apply to the student or classroom
level, not the school district level. Another set of studies shifts the focus
to educational costs— and to school districts. These studies determine
the extent to which districts with a harsh educational environment, as
measured by the characteristics of their students, must pay more to
achieve the same performance as other districts. These studies include
Bradbury et al. (1984), which looks at all local spending, including
spending on education; Ratcliffe, Riddle, and Yinger (1990); Downes
and Pogue (1994); Duncombe, Ruggiero, and Yinger (1996); and
Duncombe and Yinger (1997).3
These studies all demonstrate that a harsher educational environment,
as characterized by high rates of poverty and single-parent families, for
example, results in a higher cost to obtain any given performance level.
In other words, the harsh educational environment in some school
districts, particularly big cities, ensures that those districts must spend
more than other districts to obtain the same educational performance
from their students.
Duncombe and Yinger
7
State educational officials are sometimes aware that environmental
factors matter. For example, a report on the the  state’s schools by New
York State Education Department says that “Five indicators, each
associated with poor school performance, are useful for identifying
students at risk of educational disadvantage: minority racial/ethnic
group identity, living in a poverty household, having a poorly educated
mother, and having a non-English language background” (The
University of the State of New York 1997, p. 3). However, states’
performance standards and state aid programs do not take account of
these environmental factors in any systematic way. As a result, these
programs are, as noted earlier, both unfair and ineffective.
Alternative Methods for Calculating
Educational Cost Indexes
Several methods for calculating educational cost indexes have been
proposed by scholars. This section explores the strengths and
weaknesses of a few key methods and compares the indexes that result
when each method is applied to data for New York State.
Adjusted Input Prices
Some scholars have proposed that educational costs be measured with
an index of input prices, usually just teachers’ salaries. Because
teachers are by far the most important input in producing education,
teachers’ salaries do, indeed, have a major impact on educational costs.
However, a teacher salary index, by itself, has three major flaws as a
measure of educational costs.
First, teachers’ salaries reflect differences in teachers’ experience and
education, which are associated with quality differences across
teachers. One cannot claim that a school district has high costs
whenever it decides to hire teachers with extensive experience or with
graduate degrees. As a result, several scholars (Chambers 1995;
Wendling 1981) have suggested that salaries for teachers of equivalent
quality should be compared.
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Second, as noted earlier, teachers’ salaries at a given quality level can
be influenced by the decisions of school officials. A cost index based
solely on teachers’ salaries will provide the misleading impression that
generous school districts are forced to pay more than other districts to
obtain the same performance when, in fact, their higher spending is
entirely of their own making. To solve this problem, scholars (again,
see Chambers 1995; Wendling 1981) have suggested the use of
regression analysis with teachers’ salaries as the dependent variable
and both internal and external factors as explanatory variables. In a
typical study, the internal factors include teacher experience, education,
and certification, as well as the district’s salary structure. The key
external factors include the wage level in the surrounding labor market
and the classroom environment that confronts teachers in each district.
The regression results are then used to predict each district’s wages on
the basis of external factors with internal factors held at the sample
average. This approach explicitly recognizes that conditions in some
schools are so harsh that teachers must receive “combat pay” to work
there. In other words, equally qualified teachers will not come to those
schools unless they are paid more that they would be paid at other
schools where the private wage scale is the same.
Finally, a teacher salary index ignores the role of the environment on
the quantity of resources required. A school district with a harsh
educational environment must spend more than other districts to obtain
the same performance, even if it has the same teachers’ salaries. In
other words, environmental factors affect not only the price of inputs
but also the quantity of inputs required. To achieve any given
performance standard, school districts with a harsh educational
environment not only must pay more to attract teachers, but also must
hire more teachers (or spend additional money on other educational
programs) than schools with an average educational environment.
Thus, a cost index based on teachers’ salaries, even if it is predicted on
the basis of external factors, ignores an important source of variation in
educational costs and is inherently unfair to districts with harsh
educational environments.
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Ad Hoc Cost Adjustments for Environmental Factors
Many state aid formulas include ad hoc adjustments for environmental
factors. States may, for example, compensate districts for a
concentration of students with disabilities or whose native language is
not English. However, these programs inevitably are ad hoc, with no
demonstrated connection between the environmental factors and
educational costs.
The 1996 New York State aid programs, for example, include several
provisions that could be interpreted as cost adjustments. (See
Duncombe and Yinger forthcoming b, for more details.) Operating aid,
which is 53 percent of the total, is based on the number of “weighted”
pupils in a district. Extra weight goes to pupils in secondary school and
pupils with “special education needs,” defined as students who score
below the minimum competency level on the third and sixth grade
reading or math PEP tests. Another program, Extraordinary Needs Aid,
gives more aid to districts with lower incomes and higher poverty
concentrations. The program provides less than 5 percent of the total
aid budget, however, and the formula is not based on any estimate of
the relationship between educational costs and poverty.
Comprehensive Cost Indexes with
Controls for District Inefficiency
To move beyond input prices, a cost index must consider the impact of
environmental factors on a school districts’ costs after accounting for
teachers’ salaries and for the district’s performance. This step requires
data on district spending, teachers’ salaries, relevant environmental
factors, such as the district’s poverty rate, and variables to control for a
district’s educational performance, such as test scores and dropout
rates.  Statistical procedures lead to an estimate of the impact of input4
prices and environmental factors on expenditures, holding student
performance levels constant. This approach has now been implemented
by Downs and Pogue (1994), Duncombe, Ruggiero, and Yinger
(1996), and Duncombe and Yinger (1997). It makes explicit the
selection of performance standards and leads directly to an educational
Metropolitan Studies Program Policy Brief
10
cost index, defined as the spending a district is required to make
(relative to the average district) to meet any selected performance level.
With this approach, unobserved school district characteristics might
affect both school spending (the dependent variable) and measures of
performance (explanatory variables). As the above studies all show,
this simultaneity problem, along with the one associated with teachers’
salaries, can be corrected with a well-known statistical procedure.
One potential problem with this approach is that it might confuse high
cost and inefficiency: large districts might not have higher costs, for
example, but might instead just be inefficient. In technical terms,
ignoring inefficiency could lead to “omitted variable bias” in estimating
the effects of environmental factors on costs. One way to deal with this
problem is to use a “best-practice” technique to measure, and control
for, inefficiency. See Duncombe, Ruggiero, and Yinger (1996) and
Duncombe and Yinger (1997, forthcoming b). With this technique, a
district is said to be inefficient if it spends more on education than other
districts with the same performance and the same educational costs.
The degree of inefficiency is measured by the extent of this excess
spending. The best-practice variable, and indeed any measure of school
district efficiency, could be influenced by unobserved school district
characteristics that also influence spending. As a result, this variable,
like the performance measures and teachers’ salaries, must be treated
as “endogenous.”
Relationship among Various Approaches
In this section we will present a comparison of educational cost indexes
estimated with the above methods using data from 631 school districts
in New York State in 1990-91. The most comprehensive cost index is,
as noted earlier, based on a regression analysis of school spending.
(See Duncombe and Yinger forthcoming a for details.) The explanatory
variables are several performance measures, teachers’ salaries,
environmental cost factors, and a best-practice control for efficiency.
The three performance measures were described earlier. Input prices
and the efficiency control are statistically significant with the expected
sign. Moreover, four environmental variables play a statistically
Duncombe and Yinger
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significant role, namely district enrollment, the percentage of children
in poverty, the percentage of households headed by a single female,
and the percentage of students with limited English proficiency. We
find, as do many previous studies, that the impact of district enrollment
on costs is roughly U-shaped, with relatively high costs in both the
smallest and largest districts. Finally, because expenditures for students
with disabilities are so high in some districts, this regression includes a
disability variable, namely the percentage of students with a severe
handicap, even though it is not significant at conventional levels.5
Table 1 describes cost indexes calculated with each method. This table
shows how the cost indexes vary by region and type of district, by pupil
class size, by income class, and by property value class. The regions in
New York are downstate, for the New York City region, and upstate,
for the rest of the state. The first column indicates the number of
districts in each district class.
Results for the most comprehensive approach, which we believe to be
the most accurate, are presented in the second (bolded) column.
According to this approach, upstate suburbs have the lowest costs, with
an average index of 90.8, which implies that the average upstate
suburb must spend $0.908 to achieve the same performance that the
average district obtains for $1.00. In contrast, New York City, with a
cost index of 347.6, must spend almost 3.5 times as much as the
average district to achieve the same performance.  Costs are also6
relatively high in the three large upstate cities (Buffalo, Rochester, and
Syracuse), which have an average index of 175.3, and in Yonkers,
which has an index of 188.1. The results in this column also reveal that
costs are relatively high in the smallest and largest districts and that
costs tend to increase with income (and with property value)— except
at the bottom of the distribution.
A cost index based on New York State’s official weighted pupil
measure is presented in the third column of Table 1. This index
exhibits little variation across districts; indeed, only one category of
district, namely under 100 pupils, has costs more than 3 percent away
from the state average. Moreover, the variation that does exist appears
Metropolitan Studies Program Policy Brief
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TABLE 1. Comparison of Education Cost Indexes  for New York State Schoola
Districts in 1991 (n=631)
Socio-Economic Number of (Controlling for (Weighted Prices (Teachers’
Characteristics Districts Inefficiency) Pupils) Salaries)
Cost Indexes
Comprehensive Ad Hoc Adjusted Input
Region Type
Downstate Small 7 102.7 107.8
Cities
133.2
Downstate Suburbs 130 101.6 102.3110.5
New York City 1 98.1 124.2347.6
Yonkers 1 98.7 114.4188.1
Upstate Large Cities 3 100.3 112.0175.3
Upstate Rural 212 99.9 99.198.5
Upstate Small Cities 47 100.5 102.6106.0
Upstate Suburbs 231 99.0 98.490.8
Number of Pupils per District
Fewer than 100 1 120.3 98.7179.9
100 to 500 61 101.2 98.8109.1
500 to 1,000 113 99.4 99.7100.1
1,000 to 1,500 131 98.6 99.193.3
1,500 to 3,000 182 100.7 100.096.2
3,000 to 5,000 80 99.6 100.196.6
5,000 to 10,000 54 101.1 102.5109.8
10,000 to 50,000 10 100.7 107.5143.2
More than 50,000 1 98.1 124.2347.6
District Percentile Rank of Income per Student
Under 10th 63 99.7 99.8100.7
10th to 25th 95 100.5 99.497.4
25th to 50th 158 99.4 99.296.0
50th to 75th 158 99.4 99.998.8
75th to 90th 94 99.9 101.1105.7
Over 90th 64 102.6 101.6107.4
District cost relative to state average, which is set equal to 100.a
Source: Calculations by authors.
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to miss the high costs in large cities, the U-shaped relationship between
costs and enrollment, and the increase in costs with district income and
property value. In short, the ad hoc procedures used to determine
weighted pupils in New York State bear no systematic relationship to
costs estimated with more comprehensive methods.
A cost index based on teachers’ salaries is presented in the last column
of Table 1. This index adjusts (as do the regression-based indexes) for
the fact that higher salaries must be paid to attract teachers of a given
quality to harsher educational environments. This approach also picks
up the relatively high costs in New York City and in other large cities,
but the magnitude of the difference between city and other districts is
much smaller. Finally, this approach indicates that costs increase with
district income and property value, although the differences along these
two dimensions are small. However, this approach fails to pick up the
relatively high costs of small districts and finds only modestly higher
costs in the large districts than in districts of average size.
In New York State, the correlation between our preferred index and the
cost index based on weighted pupils is only 0.12; as shown in Table 1,
the weighted-pupil approach has little to do with costs based on a
comprehensive analysis. The correlation between our preferred index
and the teacher salary cost index is higher, namely 0.85. Although the
teacher salary cost index exhibits relatively little variation compared to
our preferred index, it appears that districts with relatively high costs
according to one index also tend to have relatively high costs according
to the other.
Cost Indexes and State Foundation Formulas
Educational cost indexes are important largely because they make it
possible to design fairer and more effective educational policies. This
section explores the link between educational costs and the design of
state school aid systems to achieve educational adequacy. Over time,
state governments have funded an increasing share of local budgets
through state aid. The majority of school aid is distributed through
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general purpose programs to fund the basic operation of schools.
Operating aid is justified primarily on a vertical equity basis— poor
school districts and their students should not be penalized for their lack
of resources or high needs.
Existing formulas to distribute state aid are seldom explicitly matched
with specific equity objectives. However, one common type of aid
program, called foundation aid, is well designed to achieve an
adequacy objective. We show how to bring educational cost indexes
into a foundation aid formula— and what happens when costs are
ignored.7
How to Include Cost Indexes in a Foundation Formula
A large majority of states use some form of a foundation aid, but they
all use spending as a measure of “performance,” and therefore do not
bring many districts up to a minimal performance standard defined on
the basis of test scores or other indicators. This need not be the case;
cost indexes make it possible to design a foundation formula that brings
all districts up to a performance standard (see Ladd and Yinger, 1994;
Duncombe and Yinger, 1997).
A foundation plan is designed to bring all districts up to a minimum
spending level per pupil if they levy a certain tax rate. The traditional
expenditure-based foundation formula provides aid (A) to districts
based on the following distribution formula:
A = E* - t*V,
where E* is the expenditure standard, t* is the state set minimum tax
rate, and V represents property value per pupil. A district receives state
aid under a foundation formula if the revenue it can raise at the state-set
tax rate, t*, is less than the foundation level of spending, E*. Districts
wealthy enough to raise the required revenue by themselves at rate t*
receive no aid from the state. A foundation grant usually is
accompanied by a requirement that each district levy a tax rate of at
least t*; otherwise, some districts might not provide the minimum
acceptable spending level, E*.  8
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Because it does not systematically account for cost differences across
districts, an expenditure-based foundation plan does not bring all
districts up to a minimum performance level; districts with relatively
high costs cannot reach the standard unless they set a tax rate above t*.
To switch from spending to performance, one must incorporate an
educational cost index into the aid formula. To bring all districts up to a
performance standard, denoted by S*, at an acceptable tax burden on
their residents, the performance-based foundation formula should be
A = S*C - t*V,
where C is the amount a district must spend to obtain one unit of S*.
The amount of aid a district receives equals the spending required to
reach S* minus the amount of revenue it can raise at t*. A
performance-based formula ensures that all districts have enough funds
to meet this performance standard given their costs, again assuming
(and usually requiring) that they levy a minimum tax rate.
Both types of foundation formulas are based on the assumption that all
districts are perfectly efficient. Because some districts are inefficient,
even the performance-based formula will not, in practice, bring all
districts up to the foundation level (and implicit performance standard)
even with a required minimum tax rate. As a result, it seems
reasonable to design a foundation formula so that every district will
have enough revenue to achieve the foundation performance level at
some efficiency level, say the 75th percentile of the current best-
practice efficiency level, which we call the baseline efficiency level. To
adjust the aid formula for less-than-perfect efficiency, we divide S*C
by the baseline efficiency level, which results in the required
expenditures to achieve S* at baseline efficiency. If the district’s
efficiency falls short of this level, it will not achieve the foundation level
of performance unless its tax rate is above t*.
Simulating the Effect of a Performance-Based Aid Program
Using data from New York State school districts, excluding New York
City (which otherwise would dominate the aid program),  Duncombe9
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 and Yinger (1997) simulate the effect of different aid systems on
student performance. These simulations employ not only the
performance and cost indexes discussed earlier, but also analyses of
voter demand for educational performance and of the determinants of
school district efficiency, which are not discussed in this policy brief.
Figure 1 reports aid distribution in New York State in 1991 under three
different aid systems. The first bar indicates actual aid in 1991, which
includes several small lump-sum programs plus a plan similar to a
foundation plan with the minimum expenditure level set at
approximately the 25th percentile of the 1991 expenditure distribution.
This plan includes two provisions that reduce its effectiveness: a
minimum level of aid and a “hold harmless” provision that prevents a
district’s aid from declining. The second bar in Figure 1 presents
estimated aid levels with an expenditure-based foundation plan, and the
third bar presents estimated aid levels with a performance-based
foundation plan that has an efficiency baseline.
A performance-based aid system targets aid to the districts with the
poorest fiscal health, as defined by the relationship between district
wealth and educational costs. Large city districts, which have below
average property wealth and costs well above the state average, would
receive a significant increase in aid compared to the actual aid received
by these districts in 1991. Aid to the three large cities would go up by
2.5 times with a 25th percentile performance standard (top panel in
Figure 1), and would increase by over 3.5 times when the standard is
set at the 75th percentile (lower panel). The higher aid would be
financed by small declines in aid to rural districts and a 20 to 40
percent drop in aid to suburban districts. By contrast, expenditure-
based foundation grants provide only modest increases in aid (15 to 30
percent) to large cities, and small cuts aid to suburbs (2 to 4 percent).
A traditional formula does not compensate large cities for their
higher costs.
Figure 2 shows the average performance, as measured by the
performance index described earlier, in each class of district under the
three aid systems. All the aid programs have the same overall state aid
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17
 budget and the two foundation grants impose a minimum-tax-rate
requirement. Each type of aid system (a column) is examined for two
different performance standards or foundation levels (the panels),
namely the 25th and 75th percentiles of the 1991 performance
distribution in New York State, as measured by the performance index.
The first bar in Figure 2 indicates performance under the actual 1991
aid system, and the second and third bars represent the expenditure-
based and performance-based foundation grants, respectively. The
performance increases above existing levels under a performance-
based formula are most dramatic for large, upstate central cities. The
average performance for these three cities goes up 72 percent with a
low standard (top panel) and by 2.5 times with the high standard (lower
panel). The new performance levels fall below the target S* because
the efficiency level in these districts falls below the baseline level. This
performance-based foundation plan also boosts performance in all other
classes of district, although not by such dramatic amounts.  10
Because the implicit expenditure standard in the current New York
State aid plan is set at about the 25th percentile of the current
expenditure distribution, a comparison of current aid (bar 1) with a
“pure” expenditure-based foundation plan (bar 2) largely reflects the
impact of eliminating hold-harmless and minimum-aid provisions and
pooling all lump-sum aid into a foundation formula (upper panel).
These steps would only modestly increase performance in large cities
and most types of districts. Moving to a higher standard under an
expenditure-based foundation would result in substantial increases in
performance in all types of districts except large cities. All the
expenditure-based foundation plans leave large cities far short of any
performance target. In fact, the most generous such plan, in the lower
panel of Figure 2, leaves large cities at a performance level well below
the 25th percentile of the current distribution.  Expenditure-based11
foundation plans, which are used in most states, leave many high-
cost districts short of even a minimal performance standard!
Figure 1: Distribution of School Aid by District Type 
Under Three Types of Aid Systems
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Conclusions
An extensive literature establishes that both school district and student
performance depend not only on factors that school officials control,
such as the student/teacher ratio, but also on factors that are outside
their control, including input prices, such as regional wage rates, and
environmental factors, such as concentrated poverty. It follows directly
that the cost of education is not the same in every district, with higher
costs in districts in higher-wage labor markets or with a harsher
educational environment. A shift to educational performance standards,
whether these standards are simply targets or are imbedded in a
foundation aid program, can be neither fair nor effective unless it
recognizes this variation in the cost of education. This shift cannot be
fair because it penalizes districts that, through no fault of their own,
face harsh educational environments, and it cannot be effective because
it hands out rewards and punishments that are not related to the
contributions of school personnel.
Scholars have identified a variety of methods for measuring the cost of
education, all of which have limitations. The simplest reasonable
methods, which are indexes of teachers salaries predicted on the basis
of conditions in the local labor market and in a district’s schools, fail to
recognize that districts with a relatively harsh educational environment
must hire more teachers (or purchase more of other inputs) than other
districts to achieve the same performance. The most comprehensive
methods, which recognize the role of environmental factors and control
for school district efficiency, involve some complex, hard-to-explain
steps. Nevertheless, the literature demonstrates that cost variation
across schools is very large and cannot be ignored. Policy makers and
scholars need to continue the search for sensible, practical ways to
measure educational costs and incorporate them into performance-
based educational policies.
Figure 2: Distribution of Student Performance (composite index)
by District Type Under Three Types of Aid Systems
Performance Standard--25th Percentile of 1991 Performance
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